Dentre os problemas tradicionais da Epistemologia, uma das controvérsiasmais persistentes é a questão da inserção versus isenção de valores naciência. Filiando-se a uma longa tradição crítica, o filósofo Hugh Laceydesenvolve um exame contundente acerca dos fundamentos da ciência emsua interação com a sociedade, questionando a noção tradicional deneutralidade científica. Pretendemos nesse trabalho estender a crítica deLacey às ciências sociais, e especificamente à Economia. Argumentamosque a ortodoxia da ciência econômica moderna , atravésda incorporação do paradigma mecanicista da física clássica, bem comode (...) todo instrumental analítico das estratégias materialistas, não representaum tipo de compreensão neutra dos fenômenos econômicos, mas sim umaparticularmente notável manifestação dos valores predominantes nessasociedade , da qual faz parte.Assim, procuramos mostrar que, também no âmbito social, a preeminênciados aspectos nomológicos e quantitativos da realidade na formulação dasteorias econômicas de tradição neoclássica espelha valores sociais altamenteestimados nas sociedades modernas.Among the traditional problems in Epistemology, one of the most persistentcontroversies is the question of value insertion versus value exemption inscience. The philosopher Hugh Lacey, in consonance with a long criticaltradition, advances a sharp examination of the foundations of science andits interaction with society, questioning the traditional notion of scientificneutrality. In this essay we intend to extend Lacey’s criticism to the socialsciences – specifically to Economics. We argue that modern economicsorthodoxy , by the adoption of the mechanicalparadigm of classical physics and all the analytical instruments of thematerialist strategies, does not represent a type of neutral understandingof the economic phenomena, but instead, a particularly considerablemanifestation of the predominant values of the society of which it is a part. So, we intend to showthat also in the social scope, the favoring of the nomological and quantitativeaspects of reality mirrors social values highly regarded in modern societies. (shrink)

In his introductory textbook, Philosophy of natural science, Hempel presents, as an illustration and a starting point for an analysis of the processes of inventing and testing scientific theories, an account of the researches of Semmelweis the Hungarian physician who, in the middle of the xixth century, discovered the cause of puerperal fever and an effective method of prevention. The account does not involve anything that is factually untrue, but it is quite succinct, leaving out many important aspects of the (...) case. Our thesis is that, although those omissions are justified in view of the aims of the account, they are also convenient to Hempel, because they help to propagate an image of science which goes much beyond the processes of invention and test. It is an image which reflects the positivist conception of science, and thus, whatever the intentions of the author, contributes to the dissemination and strengthening of that conception, but which, at least in this case, does not correspond to reality. To demonstrate the thesis, we give an account of the parts of Semmelweis's story omitted by Hempel, and we show how they do not fit in with the positivist image of science. Along the way, we distinguish three types of critique of positivist historiography: the Kuhnian, the post-modern, and the engagé. In the conclusion, we present some considerations concerning the medical research of today. -/- . (shrink)

El pasaje de la Elegía de Gray (PEG) en “On Denoting” es extremadamente obscuro y ha sido objeto de muy diversas interpretaciones. Aparentemente contiene una crítica devastadora contra la teoría de los conceptos denotativos que el propio Russell había postulado en The Principles of Mathematics (PM) (1903). En este artículo exponemos sucintamente dicha teoría semántica, examinamos detalladamente el pasaje en cuestión y exploramos algunas de las interpretaciones que pretenden desentrañar su sentido. Con ello mostramos, en primer lugar, que la crítica (...) se dirige directamente contra la teoría de PM; en segundo lugar, que no es posible hacer unos pocos cambios homogéneos para habilitar una lectura literal del pasaje; finalmente, que, si bien algunos de los argumentos que los intérpretes han aducido para abandonar la teoría de los conceptos denotativos son sólidos, no es obvio que todos ellos se encuentren en PEG. (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The dichotomy between the qualitative and the quantitative has been a classic throughout the history of science. As will be seen, this dichotomy permeates all ontological levels of reality. In this work, phenomenological examples potentially related to semiosis are presented at the different levels established by Mario Bunge and Josep Ferrater Mora, contrasting the qualitative categorizations with the quantifiable physical reality. Likewise, the need to continue in the quantification of the biosemiotic and linguistic studies will be presented, while, in contrast, (...) the need to establish a qualitative framework in the little-addressed study of technosemiotics will be raised, of potential interest given the notable advances that are expected in communication systems for inert artifacts in the next years. In short, in the thesis defended here the qualitative precedes the quantitative in the defining path of science. (shrink)

Phenomenology has been adapted for use in qualitative health research, where it’s often used as a method for conducting interviews and analyzing interview data. But how can phenomenologists study subjects who cannot accurately reflect upon or report their own experiences, for instance, because of a psychiatric or neurological disorder? For conditions like these, qualitative researchers may gain more insight by conducting observational studies in lieu of, or in conjunction with, interviews. In this article, we introduce a phenomenological approach to conducting (...) this kind of observational research. The approach relies on conceptual grounding to focus a study on specific aspects of the participants’ experiences. Moreover, the approach maintains the openness to novel discoveries that qualitative research requires while also providing a structured framework for data collection and analysis. To illustrate its practical application, we use examples of hemispatial neglect—a neurologic disorder in which patients characteristically lack awareness of their own illness and bodily capacities. However, the approach that we describe can be applied more broadly to the study of complex illness experiences and other experiential alterations. (shrink)

Philosophers of science typically focus on the epistemic performance of scientific models when evaluating them. Analysing the effects that models may have on the world has typically been the purview of sociologists of science. We argue that the reactive (or “performative”) effects of models should also figure in model evaluations by philosophers of science. We provide a detailed analysis of how models in financial economics created the impetus for the growing importance of the phenomenon of “passive investing” in financial markets. (...) Considering this case motivates the position that we call contextualism about model evaluation, or _model contextualism_ for short. Model contextualism encompasses standard analyses of the epistemic performance of the model, but also includes their reactive aspects. It entails identifying the _epistemic and contextual import of the model_, the ways in which a model can engender change in the world (which we call the _channels of transmission_), and the _interactions between the epistemic and reactive import of a model_. (shrink)

El autor realiza una lectura en clave perspectivista de la neurofenomenología, enfoque transdisciplinar y metodológico iniciado a mediados de los 90 por el neurobiólogo Francisco J. Varela desde el ámbito experimental de las ciencias de la mente. La originalidad del artículo reside en que estudia comparativamente el problemático entrecruce de la neurofenomenología de Varela con el perspectivismo científico de Ronald N. Giere, mostrándonos que la neurofenomenología no sólo lo antecedió cronológicamente, sino que fue mucho más radical al tener en cuenta (...) la la dimensión fenomenológica y trascendental de la experiencia vivida humana y al aplicarla en los protocolos de las neurociencias cognitivas. // The author makes a perspectivist reading of neurophenomenology, a transdisciplinary and methodological approach pioneered in the 90’s by the neurobiologist Francisco J. Varela, who worked in the experimental field of the science of mind. The originality of the article consists in studying with a comparative method the problematic intertwine of Varela’s neurophenomenology and the scientific perspectivism recently defended by Ronald N. Giere. In this way, the autor shows how neurophenomenology notonly came before Giere’s proposal but also how it was more radical in considering the phenomenological and transcendental human dimension and in trying an implementation in cognitive neuroscience protocols. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of some prominent aspects of intellectual history as practiced today in Latin America, especially regarding conceptual history. It delves into the way this methodology arrived to the region not long ago and discusses the way some of its practitioners combine it with the history of political languages, often ignoring the profound differences between both approaches. Therefore, the text stresses some of the most significant contrasts between them. In its last part, the article is critical of (...) the purported “globality” of global intellectual history, an issue that is inextricably linked with the pervasive use of the English language in the field. Throughout, the text poses several of the challenges that lie ahead for intellectual history in Latin America. (shrink)

Kant is not typically considered a major figure in the just war tradition's canon, although his work has informed recent discussions about international justice and just war theory. More specifically, philosophers have suggested that Kant's work may provide a coherent, normatively practical just war theory, basing this claim, in the main, on his views on the goal of peace and its purpose of establishing a cosmopolitan civil society.1 Such discussions are mostly concerned with jus ad bellum and jus in bello (...) constraints on nations and how Kant's writings can guide deliberation and, perhaps, the considered policy and practices of governments. Yet, the fact remains that it is embodied men and women and not the metaphysical ?nation? who actually conduct war. Hence, this paper seeks to determine the extent to which Kant's thought might contribute to the moral deliberation of those individuals who a fortiori will be bound to jus in bello constraints. To this end, the idea of moral learning will be explored, emphasizing the Kantian idea of autonomy. The ultimate goal of this paper is to demonstrate how some aspects of Kant's thought would contribute to ethics education in a military academy. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to clarify the notion of explanation by computer simulation in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. My contention is that computer simulation may be understood as providing two different kinds of explanation, which makes the notion of explanation by computer simulation ambiguous. In order to show this, I shall draw a distinction between two possible ways of understanding the notion of simulation, depending on how one views the relation in which a computing system that performs (...) a cognitive task stands to the program that the system runs while performing that task. Next, I shall suggest that the kind of explanation that results from simulation is radically different in each case. In order to illustrate the difference, I will point out some prima facie methodological difficulties that need to be addressed in order to ensure that simulation plays a legitimate explanatory role in cognitive science, and I shall emphasize how those difficulties are very different depending on the notion of explanation involved. (shrink)

Interview with Pierre Rosanvallon, conducted by Javier Fernández Sebastián, in Madrid, September 28, 2006.

The description of how individual models in families of models are related to each other is crucial for the general philosophical understanding of model-based scientific practice. We focus on the Capital Asset Pricing Models (CAPM) family, a cornerstone in financial economics, to provide a descriptive analysis of model relations within a family. We introduce the concepts of theoretical and empirical complementarity to characterise model relations. Our complementarity analysis of model relations has two types of payoff. Specifically regarding the CAPM, our (...) analysis reveals why this model family, which has been empirically contested, has yet remained popular and important: the different models that have been added over time have made new empirically and theoretically complementary contributions to the model family. More generally, our analysis reveals the dynamic character of model-based scientific practice. Characterising relations between models as theoretically and/or empirically complementary yields three hitherto underappreciated lessons: (i) actual modelling purposes are not always primarily epistemic, (ii) a model's individual import is relative, not absolute, and (iii) there is an important interplay between theory and data models. Faithfully characterising scientific modelling in this way facilitates subsequent analysis of models' epistemic import. (shrink)

Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those similarities, (...) it makes sense to assess the regulative view by considering some of the classical arguments against the normative nature of the intentional stance :76–100, 1985; Stich, Philosophical Topics 12:39–62, 1981; Stich, The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990). The aim of this paper is to argue that the priority that the regulative view lays on the pluralistic and regulative character of folk psychology leaves the theory well-placed to resist these arguments. In this sense, the regulative view possesses better theoretical options to defend the normative character of human social cognition. (shrink)

En este artículo se estudia el papel jugado por diferentes órdenes religiosas con vistas a la instalación de alguna de sus comunidades en el antiguo cenobio agustino de Nuestra Señora de Regla sito en la localidad gaditana de Chipiona en el marco del proceso de restauración de las órdenes religiosas vivido en España tras la supresión de las mismas, sobre todo con la llegada al trono español del rey Alfonso XII en 1875, proceso que se vio complicado por la instalación (...) en nuestro país de las comunidades religiosas expulsadas de Francia a partir de 1880. Se analiza especialmente el papel desempeñado por los franciscanos misioneros españoles y los monjes benedictinos franceses de las abadías de Solesmes y Ligugé. (shrink)

En este artículo se analizan las transformaciones producidas en el patrimonio artístico de la iglesia parroquial de la Purísima Concepción de Gilena entre los años 1874 y 1928 según los datos contenidos en varios inventarios de dicha iglesia realizados en ese tiempo.

Ampliación de un estudio anterior en la que se dan a conocer nuevas aportaciones acerca del devenir histórico de la iglesia parroquial de Gilena desde sus orígenes, en el siglo XVI, hasta el siglo XIX.

Con el presente trabajo nos acercamos a la figura de don Pedro José Baena y Núñez, quien fuera vicario general de Estepa, esto es, titular de una prelacía menor que gobernaba eclesiásticamente una jurisdicción exenta o nullius dioecesis que comprendía el territorio de lo que fue el marquesado de Estepa; especialmente se analiza su comportamiento durante la ocupación francesa de este territorio entre los años 1810 y 1812, del cual hemos tenido conocimiento a través de un proceso judicial que se (...) le incoó, llamado de purificación, al poco tiempo de la marcha de los franceses y que se conserva en el archivo de la vicaría de Estepa, custodiado hoy en el del arzobispado hispalense. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza un expediente conservado en el Archivo General del Arzobispado de Sevilla que trata acerca del intento de fundar una nueva congregación del Oratorio de San Felipe Neri en la ciudad de Écija el año 1749, fundación que finalmente no se llevó a cabo.

The main aim of this paper is to introduce an approach for understanding social cognition that we call the normative approach to social cognition. Such an approach, which results from a systematization of previous arguments and ideas from authors such as Ryle, Dewey, or Wittgenstein, is an alternative to the classic model and the direct social perception model. In section 2, we evaluate the virtues and flaws of these two models. In section 3, we introduce the normative approach, according to (...) which human, socio-cognitive competences rely on a myriad of social norms and routines that mediate our social interactions in such a way that we can make sense of each other without taking into consideration their mental states. In sections 4 and 5, we find some common premises shared by the two prior models and offer some arguments against them. In section 6, we advance some possible arguments against our approach and offer some responses against them. (shrink)

This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception. As pathologies of belief, delusions and self-deception raise many of the same challenges for those seeking to understand them. Are delusions and self-deception entirely distinct phenomena, or might some forms of self-deception also qualify as delusional? To what extent might models of self-deception and delusion share common factors? In what ways do affect and motivation enter into normal belief-formation, and how might they be implicated in self-deception and delusion? (...) The essays in this volume tackle these questions from both empirical and conceptual perspectives. Some contributors focus on the general question of how to locate self-deception and delusion within our taxonomy of psychological states. Some contributors ask whether particular delusions - such as the Capgras delusion or anosognosia for hemiplegia - might be explained by appeal to motivational and affective factors. And some contributors provide general models of motivated reasoning, against which theories of pathological belief-formation might be measured. (shrink)